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Recounting his experience as a volunteer soldier on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, 
the Spanish journalist José Luis Gómez Tello described the exciting multinational atmosphere he 
encountered in the city of Riga, with its heady mix of ‘[b]eautiful women, shining uniforms, war 
wounded, Germans on leave, Spaniards, Italians, Belgians, Walloons, Swedes, Norwegians, Finns, 
French, Lithuanians.’1 A member of the Spanish fascist party, the Falange, Gómez Tello formed part 
of the so-called ‘Blue Division’, the Spanish volunteer unit sent by the Franco regime to join the Axis 
war against the Soviet Union.2 In the midst of the genocide, death and destruction taking place 
across Eastern Europe, what stuck in his memory, and in that of many of his colleagues, was the 
melting pot of different nationalities and cultures they encountered on the Eastern Front and the 
towns and cities of the rear. For them, the wartime environment of the Eastern Front was also a site 
of transnational encounter, exchange and cooperation. 
This article uses the case study of the Blue Division to examine these forms of exchange and 
cooperation within the Nazi New Order. In particular, it explores the experiences of the Blue 
Division’s medical services, which were required to engage most closely with the international 
environment of the region.3 Not only were Spanish hospitals dependent on German supplies and 
liaison officers, but many were staffed by mixed Spanish and German teams. Spanish doctors and 
nurses worked in German military units, while Spanish hospitals employed Polish, Estonian, 
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Lithuanian, Russian and Jewish staff, and treated troops and civilians from a range of different 
countries. It was through medical services that rank-and-file troops also came into closest contact 
with the realities of the Nazi New Order. As patients, they were treated by the multinational staff in 
Spanish hospitals, and often received care within the German medical system. At the rear hospitals 
in Berlin, Königsberg, Riga and Vilnius, they lived and socialised alongside soldiers from across 
Europe, witnessed Nazi Germany and its territories at first hand, and experienced the strange 
cosmopolitanism of the occupied Baltic towns. Medical services were thus one of the key prisms 
through which the Blue Division’s troops experienced the European society they were supposedly 
fighting to defend. 
The Blue Division and its medical services shed new light on the phenomenon of cooperation and 
exchange in the New Order in a number of different ways. Firstly, they show how it was experienced 
by those from outside the core Axis states of Germany and Italy, and beyond the minority of 
ideologically-committed fascist fellow travellers. Although there were many enthusiastic fascists and 
philo-Nazis within the Blue Division, volunteers came from across the Francoist political spectrum 
and were often hostile to the Spanish fascism of the Falange and distrustful of elements of Nazi 
ideology. Secondly, volunteers within the medical corps help to illustrate how the New Order was 
perceived as a forum for scientific, intellectual and professional exchange, building on the traditional 
prestige of German science and pre-war practices of international scientific cooperation. Finally, 
integrating the perspectives of junior officers and rank-and-file troops helps to move beyond the 
political and cultural elites who dominate the literature on the New Order to show how cooperation 
and exchange worked on the ground. In particular, it demonstrates where the limits to this 
cooperation lay, and how individuals dealt with the tensions and conflicts between different national 
groups.  
The German victory over France in the summer of 1940 and invasion of the Soviet Union a year later 
saw the bulk of mainland Europe fall under the control of Nazi Germany and its allies. For many 
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fascists and fascist fellow-travellers across the continent, this moment represented the birth of a 
new system, a New Order for Europe, ushering in an era of political, economic and cultural 
cooperation under German, and to a lesser extent Italian, leadership. Plans for a radically re-ordered 
European system under Axis domination were never taken seriously by Hitler. But they were actively 
embraced by groups of officials, experts and intellectuals within the German system, particularly in 
the foreign, economic and propaganda ministries, and were mirrored by similar initiatives in Fascist 
Italy.4  
The history of the New Order has traditionally been studied from German perspectives.5 In the 
context of the wider Nazi war effort, the idea of the New Order primarily served as a tool of Nazi 
propaganda and diplomacy.  The Europeanist veneer it provided to the hegemonic, imperialist reality 
of Axis rule proved useful for securing the acquiescence of foreign fascists and fellow-travellers.6 
Particularly after the military reversals of 1943, Nazi propaganda increasingly presented the conflict 
as a struggle to defend a shared European civilization from the threat of Soviet Asiatic barbarism. 
But recent work has sought to expand these perspectives, showing how many people across Europe 
engaged with the New Order as a genuine forum for transnational exchange and cooperation. In 
part, this cooperation built on the networks of transnational fascism which had been emerging from 
the 1920s, attracting those fascists and philo-Nazis driven by a sense of ideological and political 
affinity with the Axis cause.7 But it also attracted a much wider range of Europeans, drawn to the 
myriad events and organisations established under the auspices of the New Order which brought 
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together young people, women, students, artists, sportsmen, scientists and other groups.8  Benjamin 
Martin, for example, has recently shown how both Germany and Italy sought to forge a ‘cultural 
New Order’, using music, film and literature to promote a new model of transnational cultural 
exchange.9 
This article builds on these histories of transnational fascism and the New Order, but also shifts the 
focus away from elite initiatives taking place in Germany and Italy. Instead, it uses the case study of 
the Blue Division to foreground the site where the vast majority of transnational fascist interaction 
actually took place on the ground: the Eastern Front. The German-led war against the Soviet Union 
which began in June 1941 involved one of the largest multinational military forces in world history. 
Over the following four years over four million non-German troops took part in the conflict, at their 
peak representing a third of the total fighting force.10 As well as regular units from the states 
formally allied to Nazi Germany such as Italy, Hungary and Romania, they included volunteers from 
almost every European country, as well as some from beyond Europe, incorporated into both the 
Wehrmacht and the SS. Many of the keenest supporters of the New Order belonged to the core of 
European volunteers within the Waffen-SS, whose multinational officer corps represented a 
potential future European elite.11  Indeed, if the New Order for Europe existed anywhere, it existed 
among this international melting pot of soldiers, volunteers and civilians brought together on the 
Eastern Front. 
Although only a small fraction of the Axis forces fighting on the Eastern Front, the 47,000 Blue 
Division volunteers represented the largest cohort of Spaniards to come into direct contact with Nazi 
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Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe.12 Many of the volunteers believed that they were fighting for a 
common European cause, defending the continent and its civilization against the threat of Asiatic 
bolshevism, as both Spanish and Nazi propaganda constantly reminded them. But they also gained 
direct experience of life within the European New Order they were supposedly fighting for. The 
journey to the frontline took them through France, Germany, Poland and the Baltic states. For most, 
it was the first time in their lives they had left Spain. Often travelling on foot, it brought them into 
contact with German military and civilian authorities, local populations displaying varying degrees of 
enthusiasm or hostility, and camps and columns of Soviet prisoners. At the front itself they fought 
alongside their German comrades and lived among Russian civilians. In the rear areas they 
experienced the multinational environment of towns such as Riga, Vilnius and Königsberg, where 
displaced civilians from across the region and mobilised soldiers from the four corners of Europe 
rubbed shoulders with cosmopolitan pre-war populations disrupted by the effects of war, 
occupation and extermination. 
Drawing on divisional records, contemporary press reports, and veterans’ memoirs, this article uses 
the prism of the Blue Division’s medical services to map Spanish responses to this of this violent, 
multinational environment. Section one deals with the relationship between Blue Division 
volunteers and their German counterparts, showing how medical services were at the heart of the 
Blue Division’s engagement with the Wehrmacht and Nazi authorities. Section two focuses on the 
Spanish response to the wider international environment of the Eastern Front. For many Spanish 
medical professionals, the Blue Division represented an opportunity to engage in the kind of 
international medical exchange which had been denied them since the start of the Spanish Civil War. 
Their reactions to the Eastern Front were conditioned by their enthusiasm for scientific cooperation 
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as much as their ideological affinity with the Axis cause. Spanish troops, meanwhile, saw the towns 
in the rear as exciting cosmopolitan sites of socialising and entertainment. The final section explores 
the tensions these contacts produced, particularly the significant levels of conflict with German 
troops, showing how Spanish volunteers responded by reducing contact with other national groups 
and emphasising cultural particularities. 
 
The Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 had been met with widespread enthusiasm in 
Spain, both from within the Falange and from across the Francoist political spectrum. Franco, 
although refusing to formally join the Axis war effort in the absence of German economic and 
territorial concessions, quickly agreed to dispatch a volunteer division to the Eastern Front.13 The 
large number of falangist leaders, students and activists who initially signed up were joined by 
members of the armed forces and the foreign legion, and were placed under the command of 
experienced army officers led by General Agustín Muñoz Grandes. 
The Division was first deployed in October 1941 near the city of Novgorod, around 150km south of 
Leningrad. This was one of the more stable sections of the Eastern Front, although Spanish troops 
faced heavy fighting around the river Volkhov during the first six months. New battalions began to 
arrive to replace the first cohort of troops in April 1942, and in September the Division was 
redeployed to the siege of Leningrad. In February 1943 it was involved in its largest single battle at 
Krasny Bor, which saw over 3000 Spanish troops killed or wounded. The combination of high losses 
and pressure from the US prompted the Spanish government to withdraw the Division in July 1943, 
leaving a much smaller volunteer contingent known as the Blue Legion. This group would finally be 
withdrawn at the start of 1944, although a small number of Spanish volunteers continued to fight 
alongside German troops until the end of the war.  
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Spanish volunteers saw themselves as participants in a Europe-wide struggle against the threat of 
communism. But contemporary publications and propaganda emphasised the idea that it was a 
German-dominated Europe that the Blue Division was fighting for, and within which Spain would be 
able to recapture its former glory. A key moment in the incorporation of the Blue Division into the 
German military hierarchy and the German war effort came during its initial training camp in the 
Bavarian town of Grafenwöhr, where the new troops swore an oath of loyalty to Hitler. Colonel José 
Martínez Esparza, a military veteran with a background fighting in the foreign legion in North Africa, 
described the moment in his memoirs: 
In that instant, we all felt the intimate pride of knowing ourselves Spaniards by the 
grace of God. And all of us recognised the importance to our Patria of the fact that 
we were at the heart of Europe receiving the backing of the German army, which had 
just welcomed us into its ranks. Spain once again belonged to Europe.14 
The Division’s subordination to German authority, rather than being resented, was seen as a way for 
Spain to regain its historical role at the heart of Europe. German dominance was generally presented 
in a positive light. Blue Division volunteers often described German attitudes as ‘fraternal’, 
particularly during the Division’s first arrival in the country when troops were greeted at German 
train stations by flag-waving crowds and Red Cross volunteers providing food and drink, in stark 
contrast to the aggression and hostility that had marked their progress through occupied France.15 
Spanish volunteers presented Germany as the comradely, humane and socially advanced heart of 
Europe.16 In Grafenwöhr, Martínez Esparza claimed, the accommodation and food provided to 
Russian forced labourers working in local industries was almost as good as that provided to German 
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troops themselves, and the inmates, like the French prisoners of war working in the local agricultural 
sector, were happy to be there.17  
Medical services played an important part in the positive relationship between Spanish volunteers 
and their German comrades. The Division’s Military Health Group was made up of over 500 
personnel drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, including experienced military health 
professionals and civilian volunteers. Among them were volunteer nurses from the Falange’s 
Women’s Section, the Army nursing corps, and the Spanish Red Cross, as well as senior figures from 
the Falangist health sections.18 The first Spanish hospitals were established in October 1941 around 
the city of Novgorod close to the front. From the end of 1941, the Division established a network of 
dedicated Spanish hospitals in the rear, with new facilities opening in Riga and Vilnius. A small 
hospital in Berlin was supplemented by a much larger facility in Königsberg, as well as a new 
convalescent hospital in the German town of Hof. These facilities were largely, although not solely, 
staffed by Spanish personnel, and provided over 2000 beds.19 The Inspectorate of Spanish Military 
Hospitals established an office in Berlin to coordinate their work. These facilities would remain 
operational for the duration of the Division’s deployment, although the front-line hospitals were 
moved when the Division was re-deployed to the Leningrad front. After its withdrawal in 1943, the 
majority of medical personnel were recalled and the hospitals turned over the German authorities, 
although the Blue Legion retained a medical corps numbering close to 100.20  
For the most ideologically-committed volunteers of the Blue Division, some of the best opportunities 
to develop their understanding of and links with the Nazi regime came during their time 
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recuperating in hospital. Health services in the rear, particularly the Spanish hospitals in Berlin and 
Königsberg, were central to the efforts of groups on both sides to promote Hispano-German 
solidarity. The regional Nazi Party, the Hitler Youth, and the local Ibero-American Institute all worked 
closely with the Spanish hospital in Berlin.21 The regional Nazi party in both Berlin and Königsberg 
was particularly active in providing theatre and sporting tickets for Spanish patients, arranging 
parties and social events around particular anniversaries and festivals, and delivering food parcels.22 
Invitations for Spanish patients to convalesce in sanatoria across the continent alongside German 
and other European troops were used to forge a sense of European solidarity among diverse 
national groups. In October 1942 four injured Blue Division soldiers belonging to the falangist 
student organisation, the SEU (Sindicato Español Universitario), were invited to a sanatorium in 
Cracow to recuperate alongside a group of European students injured fighting against the Soviet 
Union.23 In December, another four were sent to convalesce in German-occupied Crimea alongside 
soldiers from various other European states, with a suggestion that it would form the basis of an 
ongoing exchange.24 All of these activities were supported by local falangist officials in the Berlin 
embassy, keen to promote Hispano-German unity and to strengthen the ideological commitment of 
Blue Division soldiers.  
But political beliefs were not the only factor shaping the positive reaction of Spanish volunteers to 
Nazi Germany. Within the Blue Division’s medical corps, these ideological factors were combined 
with a strong professional desire to build close relations with German colleagues. In keeping with the 
Division’s incorporation into the Wehrmacht, the Military Health Group worked extremely closely 
with German military medical services. This process began when the Division first arrived at its 
training camp in Grafenwöhr, where German authorities provided instruction to Spanish military 
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health teams on German evacuation procedures, use of medical equipment, and rules for 
vaccination and disinfection.25 Divisional regulations stipulated that military health personnel should 
form close ties with their German counterparts to ensure that they were working in accordance with 
German procedures. A special order was sent from the captain of the Military Health Group to all his 
officers in March 1942 emphasising the importance of reflecting the ‘intimate unity’ of the Hispano-
German alliance in relations with their German counterparts and of dealing appropriately with any 
disagreements.26 Once the Division’s medical services were fully established, Spanish hospitals were 
inspected regularly by German authorities, and German and Spanish officers formed a joint 
discharge commission to assess the cases of Spanish troops presented for medical discharge. Spanish 
hospital regulations were amended to reflect German procedures, including rules concerning patient 
discipline, maintaining cleanliness and order in the hospitals, requests for leave, time of lights out 
and the use of regulation pyjamas.27 Spanish hospitals were particularly dependent on German 
authorities for supplies of medication, which clinical directors had to request from the German 
Pharmaceutical Corps every month.28 
Below Divisional level, Spanish medical personnel on both the front line and in rear areas worked 
closely with their German counterparts. During its first months at the front the Division relied on 
German hospitals until it could establish its own services. Where this caused problems with 
translation and coordination, Spanish medics were sent to treat Spanish troops in German 
hospitals.29 Some Spanish doctors and nurses also spent time working in German hospitals, studying 
Wehrmacht procedures and acclimatising to work in a combat environment. As the conflict 
progressed and the respective medical services became more intertwined, Spanish medical units on 
the front line supported German attacks where extra personnel were needed, and sent German 
troops to be treated in Spanish hospitals. Across the network of hospitals in rear areas, Spanish 
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medics worked hand in hand with their German counterparts. The two main hospitals in Berlin and 
Riga were staffed by a mix of Spanish and German doctors, with the staff at the Berlin hospital in 
1942 made up of thirteen Spaniards (including three nurses) and ten Germans.30 German specialists 
were also brought in to treat Spanish troops with specific needs that could not be met by Spanish 
personnel.31 The Division’s medical services were thus tightly interwoven with those of their German 
allies. 
One outcome of the coordination between the Division’s medical services and the Wehrmacht was 
that a large number of Spanish troops received care from German doctors and German hospitals. 
Wounded Spanish troops were often sent first to German front-line hospitals, with German medical 
personnel later in attendance during transfer to Spanish facilities in the rear.32 Before the network of 
Spanish hospitals in rear areas was fully up and running, large numbers of wounded Spanish troops 
were sent across the Reich and occupied territories for treatment. By the end of 1941 equal 
numbers of Spanish troops were receiving care in Spanish and German hospitals.33 In Cologne over 
the course of 1942, for example, over 500 Spanish troops were treated in twenty separate 
locations.34 Memoirs and autobiographies often presented the quality of this treatment in a positive 
light, with soldiers praising the professional skill of German medical personnel and the cleanliness 
and efficiency of their hospitals.35 In contrast, both Spanish troops and Spanish medical personnel 
frequently complained that the Division’s own medical services were poorly managed, dirty and 
underequipped. These impressions fed into a wider admiration for the Wehrmacht among Spanish 
                                                          
30 AGM, DEV, C.1984,14,3 
31 The Blue Division veteran Serafín Pardo Martínez, for example, describes in his memoirs how a German 
specialist was brought in to the hospital at Königsberg to treat a soldier with an aneurism. S. Pardo Martínez, 
Un año en la División Azul (Valladolid, 2005), 192. 
32 See for example Alvarez Esteban, Agonia de Europa, 371; Pardo Martínez, Un año en la División Azul, 179. 
33 Poyato, Bajo el fuego, 365. 
34 Moreno Juliá, La División Azul: sangre española en Rusia, 1941-1945, 317. 
35 J. M. Sánchez Diana, Cabeza de puente: diario de un soldado de Hitler (Alicante, 1993), 158. Further 
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troops, who saw the German army as much more fair and efficient than the neglectful and 
hierarchical Spanish military system.36 
 The Division worked hard to maintain good relations between Spanish medical personnel and their 
German colleagues. The monthly reports submitted by Spanish hospital directors contained standard 
sections on relations with foreign personnel and between wounded Spanish troops and their 
German counterparts. In general these report painted a positive picture of the relationship between 
Spanish and German medics. The hospital in Riga described its German nurses in November 1942 as 
‘excellent in all aspects, intelligent, active, orderly and disciplined’.37 The director of the Königsberg 
hospital described a ‘current of extraordinary camaraderie’ between Spanish doctors and their 
counterparts at the nearby German hospital, who frequently organised joint scientific, cultural and 
social events, and made their facilities and resources available to each other whenever necessary.38 
These positive attitudes were often reciprocated by German health officers. Towards the end of 
1941 the German military surgeon, Hans Killian, visited the Spanish frontline hospital in Grigorowo 
and spent time with the two Spanish surgeons working there, later describing them as ‘cheerful, 
friendly and helpful’, and speaking positively about their experience and their knowledge of modern 
techniques for treating wounds.39 
On both sides, these positive relations were underpinned by a shared professional identity and sense 
of scientific community. Spanish medics were particularly motivated by the opportunity to work with 
colleagues from the prestigious world of German medicine. Spanish health experts had been 
studying in Germany since the beginning of the twentieth century.40 Many of Spain’s leading doctors 
and medical researchers had spent time studying or working in Germany, including figures such as 
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Gregorio Marañon, Carlos Jiménez Díaz and Juan Negrín.41 On the Spanish side, these exchanges 
were facilitated and supported by the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios (JAE), established by the 
Spanish government in 1907 to promote Spanish science, often through support for study abroad.42 
The German state supported foreign students through a range of organisations and programmes 
including Humboldt scholarships and the Academic Exchange Service. These initiatives had helped to 
create a generation of Spanish medical professionals who regarded Germany as the centre of 
European science and medicine. From a professional standpoint, the Blue Division’s medical officers 
were thus predisposed to establishing positive relationships with their German counterparts. 
For Spanish volunteers, as for many of the other Europeans, cooperation within the New Order often 
meant cooperation with Germans and Germany. For some, that meant cooperation with Nazi 
Germany, motivated by shared ideological values and the appeal of a political system many regarded 
as the vanguard of a new global movement. But for others this ideological appeal was bound up 
with, and in some cases superseded by, other motivations for strengthening ties with German 
counterparts. For those with a scientific background like the Blue Division’s medical officers, the 
appeal of Germany also lay in its prestigious scientific history and traditions, or in the long-term 
professional opportunities which good relations with German colleagues might bring. Similar 
motivations were evident among those Europeans who embraced the cultural New Order, which 
emphasised German and Italian cultural traditions as much as the distinctive fascist approach to 
cultural production.43 Many engaged with the New Order, not just as a fascist project, but as a 
German project, with all of the cultural and historical associations which went along with that idea. 
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The organisations, projects and events established within the rubric of the New Order were under 
German leadership. But they also brought participants from countries across Europe in contact with 
each other, providing a forum for cooperation and exchange between different national groups. 
Indeed, many of the projects and networks established within the New Order echoed the language 
and practices of pre-war internationalism, despite the very different ideological context in which 
they emerged and the fascist hostility towards the League of Nations system.44 The European, 
transnational nature of the New Order was particularly evident on the Eastern Front, and the 
experiences of Spanish volunteers suggests that there were two particularly important dimensions 
to the transnational cooperation taking place there. The first was a particular form of scientific and 
professional exchange, moving beyond the cooperation we have already seen between Spanish and 
German officers to embrace a wider form of scientific internationalism. The second, evident among 
rank-and-file troops rather than just medical officers, was an embrace of the social opportunities 
provided by the cosmopolitan environment in rear areas. 
From the very start the Blue Division’s anti-communist mission, which was bound up with the 
principles of the Francoist ‘New State’ and the ideological conflicts of the Spanish Civil War, was also 
promoted as part of a wider European struggle. Speaking at Madrid’s Estación del Norte in July 1941, 
the falangist Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serrano Suñer, told departing troops that: 
…you go to defend the destiny of a civilization which cannot die; because you go to 
destroy the inhuman, barbarous, and criminal system of Russian Communism. You go 
to contribute to the foundation of European unity and also to repay blood for blood, 
friendship for friendship, to the great countries which helped us in our Civil War.45 
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This message was echoed both in the Spanish press, and in the Division’s own journal, Hoja de 
Campaña, which carried regular articles on European brotherhood, the cultural and spiritual future 
of the continent, and the historical defence of European civilization against the allied threats of 
bolshevism, Judaism and freemasonry.46 According to one falangist journalist, the war against the 
Soviet Union was the ‘most important fight since the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, 
even more than when the Turks were at the gates of Vienna.’47 Other writers drew a thread between 
the early modern Crusades, the reconquista, the Spanish Civil War’s ‘crusade’ against bolshevism, 
and the Blue Division’s new ‘crusade against Communists, Russians and Jews.’48  Whereas medieval 
and early modern Europe had been united in its defence against the Mongol and the Muslim, today 
it was the struggle against communism which drew the continent together. Anti-communism would 
provide the basis for the new European order which would emerge after the defeat of the Soviet 
Union, overcoming forever the divisions which had plagued Europe in the past. In 1942 another 
falangist journal published an article on the history of anti-communist struggle which argued that 
‘the Europe of tomorrow will have, in the spiritual, moral and political identity born against 
communism, the best guarantee of homogeneity and of peace.’49  
The nature of the Nazi military occupation and the demography of both front and rear areas meant 
that Spanish medical services incorporated workers and patients from a wide range of national and 
ethnic backgrounds. Russians, Poles, Latvians, and Lithuanians all worked in various capacities for 
Spanish military health services, particularly at hospitals in the rear. A number of these hospitals also 
‘employed’ Jewish orderlies and assistants.50 Russian prisoners of war were used extensively by the 
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Division to carry out menial tasks, including cleaning and orderly duties in hospitals, and on 
occasions Spanish front line hospitals also treated Russian civilians.51 The hospital in Königsberg, for 
instance, employed Polish, Russian and Jewish civilians, the majority of whom were women working 
in nursing and medical auxiliary roles. Other women held more senior posts elsewhere. A female 
Russian pharmacist, for example, worked at the hospital in Grigorowo, and the lab at the Vilnius 
hospital was run by a female Polish doctor.52  
For many Spanish medical personnel, this working environment represented a valued opportunity to 
pursue the kind of international professional development which had been largely unavailable to 
them since the start of the Spanish Civil War. A military orthodontist, Alfonso Ribera Sanchis, 
published a number of account of his time of the Eastern Front in Spanish medical journals which 
emphasised the benefits of working within a team comprised of Spanish, German and Russian 
practitioners, and with patients from multiple countries. ‘In his professional life,’ he wrote in 1942, 
‘the orthodontist has few occasions to deepen his understanding of areas that can only be grasped 
by leaving the Patria.’53 The Spanish army journal, Ejército, published an article by a military health 
colonel in June 1942 examining the medical corps in both the German and Soviet armies. The 
unprecedented scale of the coming conflict between the two largest mechanised armies the world 
had ever seen, the colonel argued, ‘provides ample motives for us as military professionals to try and 
learn, each within his own sphere, how the pieces of these great war machines function’.54 The diary 
of the Blue Division medical captain, Manuel de Cárdenas Rodríguez, recounted his work alongside 
German, Polish and Russian doctors, including a renowned Polish surgeon who had been dismissed 
from his university post by the Germans, and a female Russian doctor who taught him about the 
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development and treatment of typhus.55 For Spanish medics in the Blue Division, working alongside 
colleagues from the prestigious world of German medicine could thus represent both a positive 
social experience and an opportunity for professional development. Such opportunities, however, 
were not just connected to the chance to work alongside German colleagues, but also reflected a 
positive attitude towards the wider international experience the Blue Division provided, including 
the opportunity to work with doctors, nurses and patients from across the region.  
This attitude reflected the fact that many of the leading medical figures within the Blue Division had 
substantial pre-war experience of international health, in both military and civilian fields. Mariano 
Gómez Ulla, for example, was the Spanish army’s head of surgery who travelled to Berlin and the 
Eastern Front in 1942 to help reorganise the Division’s health services.56 His first visit to Germany 
had come during the First World War, when he had helped inspect prisoner of war camps on behalf 
of the Red Cross. After serving in the Spanish colonial wars in Morocco he had established himself as 
one of the leaders of the international surgical community, spending time studying in the US and 
holding a Rockefeller fellowship, one of the most prestigious international health awards available 
during the interwar period.57 His counterpart as head of the Spanish army’s nursing unit, Mercedes 
Milá Nolla, also travelled to the Eastern Front in 1943 to visit the Spanish nurses serving with the 
Division. Her international experience was in the field of civilian nursing, an alumnus of the Red 
Cross international nursing school in London (a group referred to as the ‘Old Internationals’), also a 
Rockefeller fellow, and a frequent participant in international nursing conferences and 
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organisations.58  The first leader of the Blue Division’s medical group from 1941 until July 1942, 
Alberto Blanco Rodríguez, was also an active member of the international military medicine 
community, and was involved with the International Conference of Military Medicine both before 
and after the Second World War. He was particularly active in Spanish efforts to study German 
military medical procedures and techniques after the outbreak of war.59 
For these and other leaders of the Blue Division’s medical services, their experiences within the Nazi 
New Order represented just another example of the international medical exchange they engaged in 
both before and after the war. They formed part of a transnational community of medical 
professionals, united by a shared commitment to the scientific values in modern medicine. Working 
in the international environment of the Eastern Front during the war was not a new or unique 
experience, but a familiar example of the kind of cross-border work and intercultural exchange 
which they had carried out with organisations such as the Rockefeller Foundation in earlier years. 
Figures such as Gómez Ulla and Mercedes Milá came from conservative monarchist backgrounds 
and were often in conflict with falangist forces at home. But their degree of ideological affinity with 
fascism was not necessarily any more relevant when it came to their work on the Eastern Front than 
their professional roles within the Spanish armed forces and the prestige they enjoyed thanks in part 
to their international careers. Rather than reflecting a straightforward ideological enthusiasm for the 
Axis cause, therefore, part of the positive response to the New Order within the Blue Division’s 
medical corps was underpinned by a professional commitment to scientific exchange. 
Beyond the Division’s medical officers, the reaction to the multinational European environment of 
the Eastern Front was driven by different concerns. The most positive responses focussed on the 
personal, social and romantic possibilities the international environment of the Eastern Front was 
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perceived to offer. Both contemporary accounts and later memoirs, for example, lingered on the 
care provided by foreign women in Spanish hospitals. German nurses were particularly well 
regarded by Spanish troops, representing a bewitching combination of political solidarity, maternal 
care and romantic possibility. An article on the German Red Cross nurses in the Division’s newspaper 
Hoja de Campaña eulogized ‘the girl who cared for your comrade, your brother, perhaps for you… 
[who] also plays an important role in the balance of war’. The German nurse, it argued, was a sister 
more than a comrade, encapsulating the highest spiritual values of Europe for which the Division’s 
soldiers were fighting, all combined within the figure of ‘a beautiful blonde girl’.60 The treatment 
provided by Russian, Polish, Baltic and Jewish workers in Spanish hospitals was also regarded 
favourably by Spanish troops. As with the case of German nurses, however, the focus of most 
accounts in memoirs and autobiographies was on the foreign women working as nurses and medical 
assistants in Spanish hospitals, who were often described as well dressed, friendly, flirtatious, and 
well-disposed towards Spanish soldiers.61  
This formed part of a wider narrative which characterised accounts of Blue Division troops published 
both during and after the war, particularly evident in descriptions of cities in the rear such as Riga, 
Vilnius and Königsberg where Spanish hospitals were located. These accounts seemed to embrace 
the towns in the rear as sites of dissolute cosmopolitanism, drawing together individuals and 
cultures from across the continent in a uniquely multinational environment full of social and 
romantic possibilities.  For the Blue Division veteran and falangist journalist José Luis Gómez Tello, 
quoted at the beginning of this article, Riga had: 
 ‘everything you could want to have fun: drama, winter sports, beach sports, circus, 
markets, stalls selling flowers, furs, diamonds, amber, cafes with champagne, 
restaurants, vodka at 80 marks a bottle. Beautiful women, shining uniforms, war 
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wounded, Germans on leave, Spaniards, Italians, Belgians, Walloons, Swedes, 
Norwegians, Finns, French, Lithuanians.’62  
For other Spanish troops, a period spent in the hospitals of Riga or Vilnius was often best 
remembered for the social opportunities it provided. The accounts of visits to these cities in articles, 
memoirs and autobiographies revolved around the bars, cafes and cabarets frequented by the 
Division’s soldiers, around drinking, music and women.  Many accounts lingered on the heady 
‘cocktail’ of languages and the efforts of Spanish troops to talk to the Russian, Lithuanian, Polish and 
Estonian women working in the cafes and bars.63 On his journey to the front, the Blue Division officer 
Victor José Jiménez described Spanish volunteers forming part of a ‘little International’ comprised of 
Spanish, German and Lithuanian troops, as well as Polish locals, speaking together in German, Polish, 
Russian, Lithuanian and Spanish, and the shared languages of French and English.64 
 
This embrace of the cosmopolitan environment found in the rear areas of the Eastern Front was 
largely presented in apolitical terms, reflecting the enthusiasm of young men for the social 
opportunities available during their brief time away from the front-line. But it also seemed to echo 
some of the attempts by the intellectuals and elites grappling with the idea of the New Order to 
square the circle of an international project comprised of ultra-nationalists and nationalist 
movements. As Benjamin Martin has argued, writers and artists involved in the New Order’s cultural 
programmes sought to promote the idea of a Europe of Nations distinct from the de-nationalised 
cosmopolitan internationalism they so loathed, with new forms of ‘inter-national’ cooperation 
celebrating the diversity of European national traditions.65 In a similar way, Spanish volunteers 
celebrated the particular local and national cultural traditions which conformed to their own ideas of 
European identity. In Germany they admired the orderly and prosperous towns they passed through, 
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while lauding the Catholic faith of their Bavarian neighbours around Grafenwöhr.66 On their march 
through Poland they also admired the piety of the Polish population, dining with priests and 
comparing their own experiences in the Spanish Civil War with Poland’s struggle against Soviet 
Russia.67 In 1943, the Blue Division soldier Fernando Torres wrote an article for the newspaper ABC 
describing his recent convalescence in a front-line hospital, during which the facility had been visited 
by a Kraft durch Freude group sent to entertain the injured troops. The group included a German 
accordionist, an Italian dancer, a Swedish magician and a Greek guitarist, a colourful and exciting 
apparition amidst the drab soldiers. But for Torres, this diverse display of national cultures, distinct 
but working in harmony, was bound up with the vision of Europe the Division’s troops were fighting 
for. ‘For a few hours’, Torres wrote, ‘we completely forgot that a few metres away there was a 
trench which marked the border of Europe’.68  
 
 
There were, however, clear limits to the transnational cooperation and exchange which took place 
on the Eastern Front. In the case of the Blue Division these limits were evident both in relations with 
the volunteer’s German counterparts, and with the other national groups they came into contact 
with. The region in which the Blue Division’s soldiers lived, fought and travelled, part of the 
‘bloodlands’ of the Second World War, were sites of violence and extermination.69 Although not 
direct witnesses or participants in the Holocaust, many Spanish soldiers were aware of what was 
happening to the Jewish population they came into contact with, and of German treatment of Soviet 
prisoners and other non-Aryan groups.70 Thanks to the relatively low level of partisan activity in their 
region they were not directly implicated in large-scale civilian reprisals, but were certainly involved 
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in cases of violence, rape and theft.  Despite the good relations they maintained with many of the 
Russian communities behind the frontline, they were ultimately part of an occupying force that 
brought starvation and misery to local civilian populations.71  
Spanish volunteers were aware that the Eastern Front was not a positive international environment 
conducive to professional exchange and development, but one in which the local people working in 
Spanish hospitals were doing so in the context of occupation and violence. The Division’s medical 
staff showed some signs of understanding the coercion which underlay their relations with local 
civilians both inside and outside hospital grounds. This was particularly the case with the Jews who 
worked in Spanish hospitals, most notably in Vilnius and Riga, where Spanish troops had some 
awareness of the treatment of the city’s Jewish inhabitants and the limited protection provided by 
hospital work.72 Aside from the Russian prisoners, neither divisional records nor the memoir 
literature make clear how Jewish and other local civilian staff were recruited and the degree of 
coercion involved in their employment. Hospital reports, however, showed a consistent concern 
with the levels of discipline amongst foreign staff members. While their behaviour was generally 
described as good, the annual report of the director of the Vilnius hospital in 1942 suggested this 
was ‘due to their [the foreign workers’] political situation, which perhaps more from fear than 
anything else obliges them to behave in this way’.73 Even if the employment of local civilians did not 
constitute forced labour, it was almost certainly backed up by fear of punishment or penury if 
discipline was not maintained. The persistent interest in the discipline of foreign staff in the Military 
Health Group suggests that, while they generally posed no problems, divisional commanders were 
conscious of the potential risks posed by local staff in occupied regions treating Spanish troops.  
If relations with non-German personnel were coloured by Spanish awareness of their position as 
occupiers, their relationship with German colleagues was also affected by negative and hierarchical 
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German attitudes towards their Spanish comrades, and by Spanish awareness of and reaction to 
these attitudes. Spanish medical officers, for example, often struggled to assert their authority in 
front of German troops. One particular report described a military health lieutenant at the 
Königsberg hospital who was doused in water by a German soldier whilst sunbathing. The soldier 
refused to give his name, as did a passing German officer who witnessed the incident, forcing the 
hospital authorities to report the matter to the German liaison office.74 German officers made 
continued complaints about the failure of Spanish troops to follow basic standards of dress and 
behaviour, and Spanish authorities often responded by bemoaning the German obsession with what 
they saw as petty regulations. Within the Military Health Group, Spanish personnel were frustrated 
by the approach of German military administrators who were responsible for overseeing the running 
of Spanish hospitals and ensuring they were appropriately supplied. One report from the Berlin 
hospital asked for these duties to be transferred to Spanish officials on the grounds that German 
officers spent less time on procuring adequate supplies that they did on complaining about breaches 
of regulations. ‘Due to their psychology, their discipline and their character’, the hospital’s director 
wrote, ‘they [the Germans] consider things of no consequence important’.75 The focus on relations 
with German colleagues in monthly reports and the official reminders to ensure disagreements were 
handled appropriately reflected the extent of the tensions between German and Spanish teams, and 
the concerns these tensions caused among divisional commanders. 
Hispano-German tensions, however, were not confined to medical officers or driven solely by 
Spanish political divisions. Admiration for the quality of German medical care and the pro-Nazi 
sympathy of some falangist volunteers did not translate into an enthusiastic pro-German sentiment 
among the majority of Blue Division soldiers. Significant tensions existed between injured Spanish 
soldiers and their German comrades, particularly in and around Spanish hospitals in the rear where 
                                                          
74 AGM, DEV, C.2027,7,2, p. 25 
75 AGM, DEV, C.2027,13,3, General Hospital Report, Jun 1943. 
24 
 
conflict and disciplinary problems were at their highest.76 As with the case of the medical personnel, 
many of these problems stemmed from poor German treatment of and attitude towards Spanish 
troops, and Spanish responses to this behaviour. A persistent source of tension came from 
relationships between Spanish troops and German women, which often led to conflict with German 
troops, particularly in Königsberg.77 As with the case with Spanish civilians working in Nazi Germany, 
these issues reflected the tensions between Nazi racial hierarchies, particularly relevant in the case 
of relationships between German women and foreign men, and the theoretical equality of troops 
fighting on the Eastern Front.78 The situation in Königsberg became so bad that in April 1943 the 
city’s military commander, Albrecht Brand, was forced to issue a reminder to German troops, to be 
repeated to all units on a monthly basis, that ‘for all of us it is a natural duty to treat our Spanish 
comrades who fight alongside us shoulder to shoulder against Bolshevism with amiability, and to 
help them in the rear where we come across them often as our guests’.79  
One way in which Spanish medical personnel responded to such problems was by separating 
German and Spanish medical facilities, on the grounds that the treatment of Spanish troops by 
Germans or in German-run hospitals caused both practical and cultural difficulties. In part this 
reflected genuine problems that the Division faced in keeping track of those wounded troops sent to 
hospitals across the Reich, even if they recognised the treatment troops were receiving was of good 
quality. There were also suggestions, however, that cultural and linguistic barriers made Spanish 
troops uncomfortable with aspects of the care provided in German hospitals. The Spanish hospital in 
Hof, for example, had originally been a German hospital which began to receive large numbers of 
Spanish troops sent from across the Reich in early 1942. The Blue Division agreed with German 
authorities to transform it to purely Spanish hospital, transferring out German patients and staff and 
bringing in a group of Spanish nurses. The result of this, the hospital director claimed was ‘the 
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disappearance of language problems in questions as delicate as those relating to the economic 
situation of patients, removal of psychological differences, and improvement in food.’80 Indeed the 
quality of food was an ongoing complaint from Spanish hospitals reliant on German supplies, with 
frequent reports claiming that German food was unsuited to Spanish troops and considerable efforts 
made to send certain key food supplies from Spain.81 Military health officers appreciated the 
professional opportunities provided by working alongside their German colleagues. But the 
problems stemming from the unequal power relations between the two groups prompted many to 
use the idea of insurmountable cultural differences to achieve the practical separation of German 
and Spanish medical services. 
Another common response to these problems, evident both in divisional records discussing cultural 
differences and in the later memoir literature, was to emphasise and exaggerate the idea of a unique 
Spanish character that distinguished the Division’s troops from their European (particularly German) 
comrades. In a medical setting, it was this response which underlay complaints about the 
unsuitability of German food for Spanish troops, arguments about adherence to regulations, and 
tensions resulting from relationships between convalescing Spanish troops and local women. More 
generally, it involved highlighting the friendliness, optimism and good humour of the Spanish 
soldiers, even in difficult circumstances such as the long march to the front in 1941. In contrast to 
the serious German troops, according to these accounts, the Blue Division painted names and faces 
on their vehicles and formed good relationships with local civilians.82 Although some of these locals 
‘must have thought that soldiers so friendly and free from cruelty would not make good warriors’, 
Blue Division soldiers argued, this positivity was part of what made Spanish troops so strong in battle 
and firm in the face of the enemy, their constant jokes and laughter ‘demonstrating the spirit of 
sacrifice of the [Spanish] Race’.83 Their combination of bravery and good humour was often framed 
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as part of a quixotic mission, with Spain riding out to defend the world against the Bolshevik threat. 
Central to this vision of Spanish identity was the trope, almost universal across the memoirs of the 
Division’s veterans, of Spanish donjuanismo, the preternatural ‘gift’ with women that the troops 
possessed. This was presented as a specifically Spanish trait, combining masculinity and virility with a 
romanticism and a chivalrous respect for women supposedly characteristic of Spanish history and 
culture.84 This idea lay at the heart of many of the positive responses to the Division’s international 
environment, confined as they were to a celebration of female German nurses, Jewish hospital 
orderlies or Estonian waitresses. 
The limits to exchange and cooperation evident in the case of the Blue Division’s volunteers highlight 
the failures of the New Order’s ‘inter-nationalism’ as it was experienced on the ground. The idea of a 
Europe of nations united by its distinctive national cultures never gained a wide enough purchase to 
truly influence the attitudes or actions of the soldiers who were, in theory at least, fighting to defend 
it. Relations between Germans and their allies were ultimately defined by Germany’s military and 
political hegemony. And the idea of international cooperation, however attractive from a scientific, 
professional or social point of view, was still, within the ultra-nationalist culture of Franco’s Spain, 
tainted by the association of international and cosmopolitan identities with the scourges of 
liberalism and ‘Judaeo-Masonic-Bolshevism’. Even Gómez Tello, one of the most effusive about the 
multinationalism of Riga, revealed the enduring strength of these negative associations in his 
encounters with occupied Eastern Europe, and particular with its Jewish populations. The Jews of 
the region were dismissed in his account as ‘the international Jew, without local colour’.85 And the 
Soviet architecture in Minsk was denounced similarly for its cosmopolitanism, ‘the Greek interpreted 
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by the North American with a frenzied mentality of the communist Jew’.86 The deeply ingrained anti-
Semitism, anti-communism and anti-cosmopolitanism of the Spanish right, as in many other 
European countries, indelibly coloured attitudes to the very idea of international exchange and 
cooperation.87  
 
 
The New Order for Europe was a failed project.  But its military failure does not mean it should be 
dismissed as politically or ideologically incoherent. There were certainly real contradictions between 
the reality of Nazi hegemony and the Europeanist rhetoric of New Order propaganda. And there 
were obvious tensions between the ultranationalism of those states, political groups and individuals 
involved in the New Order, and the principles of cooperation and coexistence its propaganda 
espoused. All of these issues were evident in the reactions of Spanish volunteers to their German 
counterparts and to the international environment they encountered on the Eastern Front.  
 
But the extent to which Spanish volunteers embraced the opportunities for cooperation and 
exchange, both with their German allies and with the other nationalities they encountered, should 
caution us against dismissing the idea of the New Order as one doomed to failure by its inherent 
contradictions. After all, many international projects of the twentieth-century faced similar tensions 
between national and international loyalties, or between the rhetoric of equality and the reality of 
political power and hierarchy.88 Many Spanish volunteers, like their fascist counterparts elsewhere in 
Europe, embraced the New Order because of their ideological affinity with the Nazi project. But the 
evidence from the Blue Division’s medical services suggests this was not the overriding concern for 
many others. Rather, their reactions were shaped by the traditional prestige of German science and 
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culture, by professional or social interests, or by pre-existing enthusiasm for other European 
nationalities and cultures. It was this diversity of interests which underpinned such a widespread 
Spanish engagement with the ideas and experiences of the New Order. 
 
The experiences of the Blue Division suggests that where the New Order was successful at attracting 
supporters and participants from across Europe, its success was not solely due to ideological motives 
and inter-fascist solidarity, and was not confined to the relatively small number of European fascist 
true-believers. Instead, it succeeded in those cases where it could build on pre-existing patterns of 
international or European cooperation, and on the historical reputation of and attitudes towards 
Germany and German culture. It was these factors which helped to encourage such a range of 
individuals from across the European right to engage with the New Order, often motivated by 
professional or personal opportunism. In the same way that fascist regimes were built around 
national myths, histories and traditions while presenting themselves as modern and revolutionary 
movements, so the idea of the New Order rested on Germany’s history and cultural prestige at the 
same time as it was promoted as a new model of European cooperation adapted to the realities of 
the modern world. 
 
 
